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MULTIPLE CONSCIOUSNESS AND
THE DIVERSITY DILEMMA
SUMI K. CHO*
INTRODUCTION

There are many valuable aspects of Professor Malamud's
article, Affirmative Action, Diversity, and the Black Middle Class.1
Perhaps her most remarkable point is that we as legal scholars
need not limit our arguments to those that the current Supreme
Court will accept.2 It is especially significant that Professor
Malamud-as a former Supreme Court clerk and professor at one
of the nation's premier law schools--makes this argument.3 From
a former insider's perspective, she restates the basic realist tenet
that "[a] judge will be more likely to read precedent as permitting
* Assistant Professor of Law, DePaul University College of Law; B.A.,
University of California at Berkeley, 1984; J.D., UC Berkeley (Boalt Hall) School of
Law, 1990; Ph.D., Ethnic Studies, UC Berkeley, 1992; Assistant Professor of Political
Science, University of Oregon, 1993-94; Faculty Fellow, University of Iowa College
of Law, 1.994-95.
As a junior scholar, an Asian American, and a female, it is a pleasure to "crash
the symposium party," as Jean Stefancic so aptly put it. I would like to thank
Richard Delgado for his support of this work and for conducting a diverse symphony
of voices on this symposium topic; Jean Stefancic for her expert moderation of the
panel; Margaret Montoya for her friendship and insights; Fran Ansley, my
affirmative action co-commentator; Deborah Malamud, a gracious "subject" for
comment; the DePaul law library staff for their assistance and responsiveness; and
Gil Gott for his editorial comments. I also drew on the extensive pop cultural
knowledge of my mother-in-law, Rosemary Gott, who recalled the particulars of the
Johnny Mercer song. Finally, I am particularly grateful to my skilled and committed
law review editors, Melanie Lewis, whose thoughtful accommodations around my
spring schedule enabled me to participate in this symposium, and Owen Borum.
This reply is based upon Professor Malamud's symposium presentation and first
two drafts of her article. Many of the concerns I shared at the symposium and in my
first two drafts subsequent thereto have been addressed in the final version of her
article. I find the initial exchange of ideas to be important and illuminating because
Professor Malamud's original position seems to be representative of thought patterns
shared by many self-identified liberals. Therefore, in order to preserve a portion of
the initial exchange, I have not significantly modified the original substance or tone
of my comments.

1. Deborah C. Malamud, Affirmative Action, Diversity, and the Black Middle
Class, 68 U. COLO. L. REv. 939 (1997).
2. See id. at 947-48.
3. Professor Malamud teaches at the University of Michigan Law School and
clerked for Justice Harry Blackmun in 1988-89. See THE AALS DIRECTORY OF LAW
TEACHERS 653 (1996-97).
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a broader range of action if the judge is personally convinced
there are good reasons to do so, even if these good reasons are
reasons (like societal discrimination) that must go unstated."4
Through this reminder to continually demystify adjudication,
she urges that we stop self-censoring our arguments. Such a
suggestion is liberating in the current climate for two reasons:
first, it serves as an antidote to reinvigorated conservative legal
projects that strive to "naturalize" regressive adjudicatory
practices; and second, in the specific context of affirmative action,
it promises to move us from the narrow requisites of strict
scrutiny' to discourse more openly about white supremacy' and
the true covenant of the Fourteenth Amendment, which the
courts have broken.
The general challenge to move outside of Supreme Court
precedent in affirmative action legal scholarship permits Professor Malamud to direct our focus to societal discrimination as a
primary, if not sufficient, justification for continuing race-based
affirmative action-a rationale that has been unceremoniously
4. Malamud, supra note 1, at 946.
5. Under strict scrutiny'review affirmative action programs must be supported
by particularized findings of discrimination and further a compelling state interest.
The programs also must be narrowly tailored. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2117 (1995) (identifying strict scrutiny as the proper standard
of review for all race-based affirmative action programs, whether local, state, or
federal); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493-94 (1989)
(identifying strict scrutiny as the proper standard of review for race-based
affirmative action programs enacted by local governments).
6. My working definition of white supremacy is a set of reinforcing and
synergistic beliefs and institutional practices and policies reflecting hierarchical
group power relations consistent with superiorization of white racial identity or
inferiorization of non-white racial identity. Cf. GEORGE N. FREDRICKSON, WHITE
SUPREMACY: A COMPARATIVE STUDY IN AMERICAN AND SOUTH AFRICAN HISTORY xi

(1981) (defining white supremacy as the "attitudes, ideologies, and policies associated
with the rise of blatant forms of white or European dominance over 'nonwhite'
populations"-a domination achieved by making race or color a qualification for
equal participation in civil society); Fran Lee Ansley, Stirring the Ashes: Race, Class
and the Future of Civil Rights Scholarship, 74 CORNELL L. REv. 993, 1024 (1989)
(referring to white supremacy as a "political, economic and cultural system in which
whites overwhelmingly control power and material resources, conscious and
unconscious ideas of white superiority and entitlement are widespread, and relations
of white dominance and non-white subordination are daily reenacted across a broad
array of institutions and social settings'); Evelyn Hu De-Hart, Affirmative
Action-Some Concluding Thoughts, 68 U. COLO. L. REv. 1209 (1997). For further
discussion of white supremacy in this volume, see contributions by Margaret
Montoya, Of "SubtlePrejudices,"White Supremacy, and Affirmative Action: A Reply
to PaulButler, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 891 (1997), and Paul Butler, Affirmative Action
and the CriminalLaw, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 841 (1997).
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dumped by the Court and many other policy makers.' The
resurrection of a compensatory rationale based upon past and
present societal discrimination would eliminate many of the
roadblocks that the post-liberal Court has constructed against
effective racial remedies.
Professor Malamud has also chosen to intervene in the
affirmative action debate in a most unpopular, and therefore, I
think, courageous way. She has chosen in her paper to defend the
Black' middle class as affirmative action beneficiaries. The
current vogue among liberal defenders of affirmative action is to
sacrifice middle-class African Americans as affirmative action
beneficiaries in exchange for a putative, class-based system.9 In
rhetorical defense of such a compromise, stark juxtapositions are
often made of the proverbial black "son of the Pittsburgh neurosurgeon' to the "son of the white sanitation worker."" Who can
argue with such proof of the moral unfairness of current racebased affirmative action policies? Professor Malamud's position
as a self-identified white liberal who theorizes about class makes

7. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 490 (disapproving of societal discrimination as a
rationale to support racial classifications by local and state governments); Wygant
v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274 (1986) (rejecting societal discrimination
as a basis for implementing race-based affirmative action by state or local
governments and requiring instead "some showing of prior discrimination by the
governmental unit involved").
8. I choose to capitalize "Black" for the reasons articulated by Kimberl6
Williams Crenshaw in Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and
Legitimation in AntidiscriminationLaw, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1331 n.2 (1988)
("Blacks, like Asians, Latinos, and other 'minorities,' constitute a specific cultural
group and, as such, require denotation as a proper noun.'). However, I do not
capitalize Black when quoting from Professor Malamud's article, as that is not her
analytical preference.
In response to the anti-essentialist critique, I would expand Crenshaw's concept
of "cultural group" to "political-cultural group" to recognize that the externally
imposed racialization of the previously mentioned groups based upon white
supremacy interacts with the internally generated cultural group formation.
9. See Richard D. Kahlenberg, Class-BasedAffirmative Action, 84 CAL. L. REV.
1037, 1097 (1996) (arguing that class-based affirmative action "should supplant,
rather than supplement race-based" affirmative action). For his book-length
treatment of the same argument, see generally RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG, THE
REMEDY: CLASS, RACE, AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION (1996).
10. Malamud, supra note 1, at 951 (citing CHRISTOPHER EDLEY, JR., NOT ALL
BLACK AND WHITE: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, RACE, AND AMERICAN VALUES 81 (1996)).
11. Ironically, Kahlenberg uses the juxtaposition of "Bill Cosby's offspring over
the son of a white sanitation worker" to illustrate the moral unfairness of race-based
affirmative action. Of course, Kahlenberg wrote both his book and his article cited
above prior to the murder of Bill Cosby's only son. See Kahlenberg, Class-Based
Affirmative Action, supra note 9, at 1061.
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her defense of affirmative action for the Black middle class
especially potent, since it is immune from attack as mere selfinterestedness in an impermissible "racial spoils system."'2 When
a professed liberal, white female from a lower middle-class
background questions the underlying policy issues, the image of
a white sanitation worker must rely on more for moral suasion
than the unstated, racist premises of its juxtaposition to the
parasitic and pampered Black brain doctor.
While I agree with Professor Malamud's defense of both the
compensatory rationale and middle-class African Americans, I do
not see why, as a consequence, we must reject the diversity
rationale and the inclusion in affirmative action programs of
other middle-class minorities in order to make the case. I
suppose this zero-sum framing may be emblematic of what
divides liberals from race crits (such as myself). The strategic
posture of "multiple consciousness"'"3 may inform race crits'
understanding of the diversity rationale, so that we are more
hesitant to dispense completely with it, especially when appeals
to diversity may be the only way for people of color to retain a
foothold in institutions of higher education in light of ongoing
legal and political backlash against affirmative action. While her
critique of diversity as a legitimating rationale is compelling,
Professor Malamud, like critical legal scholars who harshly
critique rights discourse, 14 may not fully appreciate the cultural
12. Affirmative action critics often refer pejoratively to affirmative action as a
spoils system. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2112
(1995) (applying strict scrutiny review to even federal affirmative action plans to
"smoke out" governmental objectives that may be motivated by what the Croson
Court referred to as "simple racial politics); Croson, 488 U.S. at 510-11 (suggesting
that affirmative action is merely a form of racial politics in which a "racial group
with the political strength" will "negotiate 'a piece of the action' for its members")
(quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 539 (1980)); Jim Chen, Diversity and
Damnation, 43 UCLA L. REv. 1839, 1897 (1996) (referring to affirmative action
policies in education as "racial patronage" and as an "academic spoils system").
13. Mari Matsuda applied W.E.B. DuBois' concept of "double consciousness"
(African Americans' simultaneous understanding of the world based upon the
dominant mainstream perspective in addition to one's outsider viewpoint) to rights
discourse, observing that "the victim of racism can have a mainstream of
consciousness of the Bill of Rights, as well as a victim's consciousness ... [that]
combine powerfully to create a radical constitutionalism . . ." Mari J. Matsuda,

Looking to the Bottom: CriticalLegal Studies and Reparations,22 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 323, 334 (1987).
14. Some of these critiques are included in an influential critical legal studies
anthology entitled The Politics of Law: A Progressive Critique,published in 1982.
See, e.g., Alan D. Freeman, Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review, in THE
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and political import of the diversity rationale. Moreover, her
reclamation project to restore the compensatory rationale trades
the benefits and limitations of one liberal defense of affirmative
action for another, without necessarily incorporating the power
of more transformative perspectives.
This reply has two main parts. In Part I, I use a multiply
conscious strategic sensibility to engage Professor Malamud's
critique of the diversity rationale. I argue that her criticisms
underappreciate the cultural dimensions of racial subordination
and the political import of the diversity rationale as a conceptual
tool that facilitates community empowerment and coalition
building. In Part II, I assess her proposals for reform from a
critical race theory perspective. Professor Malamud's version of
the compensatory rationale, which as a general principle may
hold promise, is limited to a liberal, neo-Myrdalian 5 "societal
discrimination-as-prejudice" analysis that is rooted in a pre-civil
rights era understanding of racial theory.
I offer the following comments as an inter-communal critique
that aims to build alliances between white liberals and race crits
who mutually seek to support affirmative action. How we differ
may largely be a question of focus. Rather than viewing affirmative action as a whole remedy for racial discrimination to be
embraced in part-a la Clinton's "mend it, don't end it" approach-I view affirmative action as a partial remedy to be
embraced in whole, and extended. Perhaps, as I suggest in my
conclusion, our differences in focus and acceptable rationales may
be rooted in how we interpret the unstated predicate and,
therefore, the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Professor Malamud adopts a hybrid, progressive-liberal
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Her reading is
progressive insofar as she rejects the current, dominant tendency

POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGREssIVE CRITIQUE 281 (David Kairys ed., 1982) [hereinafter
THE POLITICS OF LAW]; Robert W. Gordon, New Developments in Legal Theory, in THE
POLITICS OF LAW, supra at 96.
15. Gunnar Myrdal challenged dominant pre-World War II era race theories of
biological determinism and successfully replaced them with a "prejudice/bias" model
of racial inequality. See generally GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE
NEGRO PROBLEM INMODERN DEMOCRACY (1944). For a fuller discussion of Myrdal's
views on race, prejudice, and inequality, see infra Part II.B.

1040

UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68

to see the Fourteenth Amendment as imposing a color blindness,
offering instead an "understanding that race-based economic
inequality stands in the way of achieving diversity without
affirmative action."16 Her ahistorical, episodic treatment of race
and racism, however, maintains a liberal stance insofar as she is
more concerned with developing limiting principles for an already
limited and disfavored racial remedy17 than with envisioning a
wider set of effective, comprehensive remedies to redress the
myriad economic, social, and psychological injuries inflicted under
centuries of white supremacy. Not only does Professor Malamud
fail to provide for the expansion of affirmative action or other
racial remedies, her preference for limitable (and therefore
defensible) affirmative action reifies the legitimacy and practice
of contemporary meritocracy. 8 Only by underappreciating the
temporal and geographical depth and breadth of race and racism
as foundational, constitutive elements of U.S. constitutional
democracy can one be more concerned with remedial limitation
than with expansion of one of the few proven effective racial
remedies.
In my conclusion, I conceptualize a somewhat different
historical understanding reflected in the Fourteenth Amendment's unstated predicate-one that reflects a "survival covenant"
necessitated by a history of genocide, slavery, conquest, forced
assimilation, colonization of labor practices, and other forms of

16. Malamud, supra note 1, at 941.
17. One key objection Professor Malamud identifies in her critique of the
diversity rationale is the "Very Permanence of Diversity-Based Affirmative Action."
Id. at 966. The diversity rationale, she notes, "knows no end point" and "contains no
internal limiting principle." Id. "Affirmative action can be temporary... only if it
is based on an identified social problem that we are simultaneously working to cure."
Id.
18. For example, Professor Malamud contends that the diversity rationale is
"dangerous if no effort is made to account for the reason why the black middle class
cannot compete using traditional merit criteria." Id. at 955. The legitimacy of
"testocracy" is taken for granted so that Black [under]performance is framed as a
threat to [pseudo]meritocracy. For a critique of testocracy posing as legitimate
meritocracy, see Michael Olivas, ConstitutionalCriteria: The Social Science and
Common Law of Admissions Decisions in Higher Education,68 U. COLO. L. REV.
1065 (1997) (critiquing standardized measures of merit as "socially constructed value
judgments, not psychometrically determined predictors"); Susan Sturm & Lani
Guinier, The Futureof Affirmative Action: Reclaiming the Innovative Ideal, 84 CAL.
L. REv. 953, 968 (1996) (referring to the widespread belief in the functionality of
standardized tests as a "testocracy" that masquerades as a "meritocracy" and finding
that standardized tests are neither fair, functional, nor predictive).
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racial subjugations. 9 Outside of the survival covenant interpretation, I contend that the Fourteenth Amendment has little
meaning.
I.

PROFESSOR MALAMUD'S CRITIQUE OF "DIVERSITY"

In this section, my comments to Professor Malamud's critique
of the diversity rationale attempt to complete the picture she has
only partially painted. The elided elements I provide are
necessary in order to ground an understanding of diversity's place
in ongoing struggles for racial justice. While we may find fault
analytically with the diversity rationale, "critical race praxis 2 °
demands that our work account more completely for the connection between analysis and the contours of antisubordination
practice.21 In this spirit, then, I offer first a supplement to
Professor Malamud's understanding of the structure of racial
injustice and its remedies, and second, an additional
performative-leve 22 grounding for the assessment of diversity.
A.

The Diversity RationaleResponds to the Cultural
Injuries of Racial Subordination

In her article, Professor Malamud observes that one way in
which advocates of race-based affirmative action have avoided
the calls for class-based affirmative action has been to emphasize
diversity as the core reason for affirmative action.2 3 After

19. See Robert Meister, Sojournersand Survivors: Two Logics of Constitutional
Protection,3 U. CHI. L. ScH. ROUNDTABLE 121 (1996) (recognizing the constitutional
crisis triggering the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment-namely for the country
to "survive" its negative history of racial subjugation); see also infra Conclusion.
20. For a definition of critical race praxis, see Eric K. Yamamoto, CriticalRace
Praxis: Race Theory and PoliticalLawyering Practicein Post-CivilRights America,
95 MICH. L. REV. 821, 875-80 (1997) (outlining the conceptual, performative,
material, and reflexive starting points of a critical race praxis framework that
combines a "critical pragmatic socio-legal analysis with political lawyering and
community organizing for justice practice by and for racialized communities").
21. See id. at 829.
22. See id. at 879-80.
23. Professor Malamud identifies three extra-jurisprudential reasons why
diversity has become the main rationale to support affirmative action policies: (1)
The diversity rationale "lowers the institutional costs of pursuing affirmative action"
because current definitions of "merit" do not have to be disturbed for
implementation. The diversity argument also sidesteps William Julius Wilson's
"race-for-class" prioritization of "truly disadvantaged" within the African American

1042

UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68

explaining the attraction of the diversity rationale to defenders of
affirmative action,24 she offers a critique of the diversity defense.

In its place, she would prefer that race-based socioeconomic
discrimination take center stage in the liberal defense of racebased affirmative action.25
At the outset of her article, Professor Malamud states "that
the diversity rationale is unconvincing unless it is coupled with
an understanding that race-based economic inequality stands in
the way of achieving diversity without affirmative action."2
Professor Malamud is clearly not saying that there is no racial
basis for affirmative action, but rather that the racial basis is
only invocable using a compensatory rationale.2 7 A diversity
rationale fails, according to Professor Malamud, because it leads
to an indeterminate set of relative identity valuations that are
apt to miss the significance of race or class. In short, because she
identifies historical and material deprivations and inequalities as

community. See Malamud, siupra note 1, at 948-51. (2) The diversity rationale
renders irrelevant middle-class African American performance on traditional merit
criteria by defining diversity as merit, thereby providing a way to "smuggle" in race
as a permissible bona fide occupational qualification premised upon customer
preference. See id. at 951-53. (3) The diversity rationale makes affirmative action
permanent by making it unnecessary to answer when such programs should end.
See id. at 953-54.
24. Prefacing her three reasons, Professor Malamud notes that "[e]mbracing the
diversity rationale has a number of clear advantages for advocates of the view that
the black middle class is a proper beneficiary of affirmative action." Id. at 949. It
should be clear from the three reasons she selected that these are the advantages
from her particular liberal perspective, but that radical critics of meritocracy may
have divergent notions as to why the diversity rationale is important. In particular,
progressive race theorists may find problematic the uncritical acceptance of
"testocracy" and meritocracy inherent in advantage number 2, see supra note 18 and
accompanying text, as well as the ahistorical, episodic understanding of racial
oppression evinced in her framing of advantage number 3, noting the permanence
of affirmative action under diversity rationales. For a discussion of the three
advantages, see supra note 23.
25. See Malamud, supra note 1, at 940 (arguing that "the diversity rationale is
highly problematic and ought not to be made to stand alone. Instead, the diversity
rationale is most persuasive when it is augmented by the view that past and present
race-based economic inequality is the reason we cannot achieve meaningful levels of
integration without using affirmative action.").
26. Id. at 941.
27. Her contribution in this article is to provide a present-day/future-oriented
compensatory rationale for affirmative action as opposed to one that is backwardlooking.
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the legitimate reasons for compensating people of color-even
middle-class people of color-through affirmative action policies,
the untethered diversity principle, which is analytically distinct
from historical and material inequalities, provides no sound basis
for a race-conscious remedy.28
Professor Malamud's elevation of the material inequality
basis for race-based affirmative action and her rejection of the
diversity basis embrace an economic-disadvantage understanding
of racial injustice, locating the injury of racial injustice primarily
in the field of economic wrongs and maldistribution.2 9 By
focusing on socioeconomic effects of racial oppression, however,
she ignores racism's monumental cultural dimensions, thus
reproducing a classic oversight of class-based inquiries by

devaluing the role of culture in both negative and positive
significances---catering, if you will, to the "body" of racial subordination and resistance while ignoring the "head."' Rather than

28. To be sure, some critical race theorists share the concern of the
"untetheredness" of the diversity principle with Professor Malamud. Cf. Sheila
Foster, Difference and Equality: A CriticalAssessment of the Concept of "Diversity,"
1993 WIS. L. REV. 105, 111 (arguing that the "current concept of diversity is 'empty'
because it lacks a mediating principle. By treating all differences the same, it
ignores the 'salience' of certain differences in this society by extracting differences
from their sociopolitical contexts.') Yet rather than "trash" completely the diversity
principle, race crits have sought to resurrect it more effectively. Foster, for example,
both critiques and offers an operative definition of "diversity" that would recognize
systematic exclusion and disadvantage based on individual differences. See id. at
112.
29. See Malamud, supra note 1, at 988 (identifying her major emphasis as
"explain[ing] why the economic case for black middle-class affirmative action ought
to be made, and why the evidence supports the claim that the black middle class is
economically disadvantaged in comparison with the white middle class for reasons
centrally related to its race").
30. Professor Malamud does have an appreciation for the cultural injuries of
racism, as reflected in her first and second draft subsection comparing Black and
white middle classes on 'The Management of Rage" and through her examples of
prejudiced taxicab drivers in New York City and trailing "loss prevention agents" in
department stores. See id. at 986, 994. She ascribes to a Bourdieu-inspired
understanding of the economic and "social capital" in particular. See id. at 969 n.64.
See generally Deborah C. Malamud, Class-Based Affirmative Action: Lessons and
Caveats, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1847 (1996) (forwarding a complex cultural understanding
of the concept of class). Overall, however, her analysis tends to view cultural injuries
as significant primarily because of their impact upon a group's socioeconomic status,
not because of any independent damage such injuries pose in terms of cultural
disrespect. See Malamud, supranote 1, at 994 (concluding that "racialdisadvantage
of being black and middle-class [is] a more powerful barrier to personal and
intergenerational advancement than the class disadvantage of being white and
working-class," which leads to her support of affirmative action for the Black middle
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limiting the operative field of racial injustice to the economic, a
more comprehensive model would acknowledge the metabolic
relation of economic and cultural subjugations that constitute
racial injustice. Of course, the opposition of economic and
cultural fields of injury"' has been at the core of a longstanding
tension among critical theorists, 2 with conservatives all too
happy to warm themselves on some of the theoretical heat that
has been generated.
In her recent work, Nancy Fraser addresses the contemporary class versus identity divide that has alienated segments of
the New Left, feminists, gays and lesbians, and race crits from
each other.3 3 Fraser problematizes the intractability of the

class).
31. Michael Omi and Howard Winant identify two of the three dominant
paradigmatic approaches to race relations as class-based approaches and nation-

based approaches. Class-based approaches emphasize "economic structures and
processes" while nation-based approaches emphasize a common history of
"colonization," which shapes the need for "cultural autonomy" as a form of "national
liberation." MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED
STATES 24, 38 (2d ed. 1994).
32. Indeed, Nancy Fraser's recent work itself, see infra note 34, has been
critiqued for establishing such a hierarchy. Iris Marion Young objects to the
dichotomous shaping of economic and cultural spheres of injury and corresponding
remedy. See Iris Marion Young, Unruly Categories: A Critiqueof Nancy Fraser's
Dual Systems Theory, 222 NEw LEFT REV. 147, 150-54 (1997) (critiquing Fraser's
redistribution/recognition theory as "brazenly dichotomous" in which injustices and
remedies are "reducible to two, and only two, mutually exclusive categories"). While
Young offers a valid critique insofar as Fraser's tendency to identify "pure" forms of
culturally based oppression leads to the false dichotomy problem, see infra note 42
on Fraser's presumption of the pure cultural case for sexuality, I am not sure that
Young's wholesale dismissal of Fraser's contribution is altogether helpful or
warranted.
33. See supra note 14 and accompanying text for the New Left critique of civil
rights, which race crits would later challenge in a classic volume of the HarvardCivil
Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review. See Harlon L. Dalton, The Clouded Prism, 22
HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 435, 444 (1987) (articulating "the feeling or fear of many
people of color that even as we are being silenced or ignored, our concerns are being
appropriated"by critical legal studies); Richard Delgado, The EtherealScholar: Does
CriticalLegal Studies Have What Minorities Want?, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 301,
322 (1987) (concluding that critical legal studies "does not provide what minorities
seek" given "CLS scholars' ironic failure to articulate a satisfactory theory of either
the genesis or the treatment of racism"); Matsuda, supra note 13, at 331 (calling
upon critical legal scholars to extend stated political commitments on racial issues
to the "practice of critical scholarship and the development of theory"); Patricia J.
Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from DeconstructedRights, 22
HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 401, 405 (1987) (pointing out how critical legal studies "has
ignored the degree to which rights-assertion and the benefits of rights have helped
blacks, other minorities, and the poor").
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opposition-class versus identity-and reconceptualizes remedial
action to analytically ensure that redress of economic injustice
does not necessarily subvert the amelioration of cultural
injustice. 4 In short, Fraser identifies economic injustices, which
are rooted in political structures and processes-such as labor
exploitation, labor market segmentation, and historically rooted
deprivation-as separable from cultural or symbolic injustices,
which are rooted in societal representation, interpretation, and
communication-such as coerced assimilation, cultural domination, invisibility, and disrespect.3 6 The former set of injustices
requires redistributionist remedies to redress the material
wrongs, while the latter set calls for recognition-based remedies
to redress cultural exclusion and psychological harm inherent in
racially oppressive societies.3 7
One key contribution of Fraser's work is to reinforce the
concept of "cultural injustice" that requires societal remedies on
a par with, and inseparable from, those addressing socioeconomic
injustices. 38 While wrongs requiring redistribution may be
analytically distinct from those requiring recognition, Fraser is
careful to acknowledge that, in practice, economic and cultural
injustices are often "interimbricated so as to reinforce one another
dialectically." 9 Nevertheless, she argues that retaining the
analytical distinction between the two types of injustices and
requisite remedies is useful and illuminating.4" While economic
forms of injustice require restructuring of the political economy,
cultural injustice requires symbolic or representational affirmation.4 '

34. See Nancy Fraser, FromRedistribution to Recognition? Dilemmas of Justice
in a 'Post-Socialist'Age,212 NEW LEFT REV. 68, 69 (1995) (defining her project as one
in which she may conceptualize cultural recognition and social equality in ways that
support, rather than undermine, one another).
35. See id. at 70-71.
36. See id. at 71.
37. See id. at 73.
38. See id. at 71-72 (relying upon cited passages from political theorists such
as Charles Taylor and Axel Honneth to emphasize the importance of such cultural
or symbolic injustices).
39. Id. at 72.
40. See id. at 74.
41. See id. at 73.
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Becauseoracial injustice42 involves both political-economic and
cultural-symbolic injuries, race-based affirmative action as a
remedy may fulfill either a redistributive or a recognitional
objective.4" As a redistributive remedy, it reallocates jobs,
educational opportunities, and valuable societal resources to
those who have suffered (or are suffering) material deprivation
according to race." As a recognitional remedy, it reallocates
"respect" to those who have been (or are being) devalued, assimilated, stereotyped,
or made invisible under white supremacist
45
norms.

Using Fraser's insight, we see that affirmative action has the
double potential for both economic redistribution and cultural
affirmation. However, Professor Malamud treats as zero-sum the
redress of economic versus cultural injuries through the policy of
affirmative action. 4' Her retrieval of societal discrimination as a
42. Fraser identifies race and gender as encompassing political-economic as
well as cultural-valuational dimensions, therefore requiring both redistribution and
recognitional remedies. See id. at 78-79. In contrast, she identifies sexuality as
implicating primarily recognition-based remediation because its roots do not lie in
the political economy, as les/bi/gays are distributed throughout the entire class
structure of capitalist society, occupy no distinctive position in the division of labor
and do not constitute an exploited class. See id. at 77-78. Rather their mode of
collectivity is that of a despised sexuality rooted in the cultural-valuational structure
of society. See id.
43. See id. at 80-81. I depart from Fraser's analysis on this point. The historic
lack of serious attention to the material dimension and study of gay/bi/lesbian
economic life and class structure calls into question Fraser's premature conclusion
of sexual minorities as a monovalent collectivity. Recent work in queer theory is
beginning to question this very premise. See generally HOMO ECONOMICS (Amy
Gluckman & Betsy Reed eds., 1997); THE MATERIAL QUEER (Donald Morton ed.,
1996). See also Young, supra note 32, at 157 (pointing out that "primary political
goals of gay, lesbian, bisexual, transsexual or queer activists are material, economic
and political equality: an end to discrimination in employment, housing, health care;
equal protection by police and courts; equal freedom to partner and raise children).
Fraser recognizes the redistributive role that affirmative action policies may fulfill.
See Fraser, supranote 34, at 90. I identify its recognitional aspects. See infra notes
43-47 and accompanying text.
44. See Fraser, supra note 34, at 90. However, Fraser categorizes affirmative
action as an affirmative versus a transformative remedy because it only provides
surface reallocations without addressing overall employment/educational structures
(no increase in number of jobs or spaces; no challenge to the concept of merit). See
id. at 91.
45. While the presence of people of color in predominantly white institutions
may reallocate this respect and decenter Eurocentric norms, Fraser points out that
the need for continual reallocations of positions or slots "can elicit intense backlash
misrecognition" of those receiving surface reallocations as privileged. Id. at 91.
46. When introducing her section on "The Disadvantages of the Diversity
Rationale," Professor Malamud declares that "what appears to be the advantage of
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rationale matches the redistributive goal of affirmative action.
But her discarding of the diversity rationale dispenses with the
recognitional goal of affirmative action. Professor Malamud's
materialist logic seems to lack a full appreciation for the cultural
oppression visited upon people of color under white supremacy.
As Charles Taylor points out:
Nonrecognition or misrecognition... can be a form of oppression, imprisoning someone in a false, distorted, and reduced
mode of being.
Misrecognition shows not just a lack of due respect. It
can inflict a grievous wound, saddling its victims with a
crippling self-hatred. Due recognition is not just a courtesy we
owe people. It is a vital human need."'
Under Fraser's more expansive thinking, one can see the import
of crafting racial remedies responsive to, and supportive of, both
economic and cultural injustices, and that we should carefully
avoid promoting remedies that privilege claims of economic
injustice while devaluing claims of cultural injustice, or vice
versa. I fear that Professor Malamud's corrective,48 though wellintended, threatens to do just that-redress economic wrongs by
elevating the compensatory rationale for affirmative action at the
risk of occluding cultural wrongs and, as important, misapprehending the negative dialectic of racial injustice.
the diversity rationale-its movement away from issues of social [read economic]
justice-becomes its disadvantage." Malamud, supra note 1, at 954-55.
47. CHARLEs TAYLOR, MULTIcULTURAuSM AND 'THE PoLITIcs OF RECOGNITION"
25-26 (1992).
48. A close reading of Professor Malamud's work reveals that her critique of
class-based affirmative action for its failure to address fully the plight of the African
American middle class is intended to strengthen and expand the case for a classbased affirmative action, with race and gender added on as supplemental policy
determinants. Near the close of her article, as well as in a previous article, she
admits that class-based analyses are unlikely to be sensitive to issues of race and
will therefore freeze out the Black middle class. See Malamud, supra note 1, at 992;
see also Malamud, supra note 30, at 1894-1900. The purpose of her present article
is to make the case for applying a class-based analysis to the middle classes by
pointing out the systematic differences between the Black and white middle classes.
At the very least, she argues, even if the racial disparity and inequality between the
Black and white middle classes are not acknowledged by including the Black middle
class in class-based affirmative action programs, there is a case for co-existing classbased and race-based remedies. In other words, race-based affirmative action is
defensible as corrective to the imperfections of a superior class-based remedy, which
might have racial blind spots.
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B. The Diversity RationaleProvides PoliticalSpace to
Organize Coalitions and Create Community
In her critique, Professor Malamud argues that the diversity
rationale is based upon white institutional utility, rather than
minority desert.49 She objects to premising affirmative remedy
49. See Malamud, supra note 1, at 958-64. Here, I find some of Professor
Malamud's unstated assumptions about the lack of "minority desert" in affirmative
action practices to be unfounded and troubling. In one of her hypotheticals to
illustrate the pitfalls of utilitarian affirmative action, she asks us to consider two
teachers, one white and one Black who are hired by a school district. "As a diversity
hire," she hypothesizes, "the black employee was hired with less previous job
experience and poorer academic preparation; therefore, she assumes (with some
reason) that she must work especially hard at her assigned tasks in order to compete
and succeed." Id. at 962-63.
Professor Malamud assumes that in the practice of racial discrimination, it is
easy to separate out the problem of employment discrimination (remediable through

Title VII) from the need for affirmative action. She would like for affirmative action
to be reserved for those cases in which people of color require an affirmative, albeit
heavy, "thumb on the scale" and to preserve employment discrimination lawsuits for
those cases in which equal opportunity is not at hand. See id. at 955. In an earlier
version of her article, Malamud maintained that neither radical critiques of merit-

even if correct-nor Griggs-likedisparate impact violations provide legitimate "firstlevel" defenses against affirmative action.
This neat analytical division, however, between clear departures from equal
opportunity and morally ambivalent situations requiring the "heavy thumb" also
breaks down in practice. Given the increasing sophistication of the operation of
white supremacy and white privilege in employment discrimination law and
employment, affirmative action is often a substitute for equal opportunity. For
example, in university faculty affirmative action (very similar to the hypothetical
situation described), many "diversity hires" are often overachieving superstars who
might never have been hired by an individual, recalcitrant department or school but
for institutional financial incentives offered through affirmative action programs,
such as "Target of Opportunity" ('
TOF) hires. In a TOP hire, the central university
administration would offer to "finance" the salary of the diversity candidate to induce
a (race and/or gender homogenous) department or school to break with its tradition
of all-white and/or all-male hiring by providing a "freebie" superstar academic of
color.
Higher educational institutions initiated such programs in the pre-Croson 1980s
to compete for those who brought "diversity and excellence" to the university.
Therefore, Professor Malamud's automatic assumption that "diversity =
noncompetitive" does not comport with my experientially and anecdotally informed
understanding of "diversity hiring" in educational institutions. The diversity
rationale supporting affirmative action often confuses people into believing that all
diversity hiring utilizes affirmative action-a common mistake triggered by the face
value of "diversity" labeling coupled with an underappreciation for the interplay of
interest convergence and political stratagem. For an elaboration on this interplay,
see infra notes 53-73 and accompanying text.
In her final draft, Malamud acknowledges the increasing sophistication of
discrimination: 'The lesson of the last thirty years of antidiscrimination enforcement
is that discrimination is a subtle and adaptive phenomenon that is tenacious beyond
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upon the white baseline of short-term benefits to an institution's
goals and needs.'0 To do so places affirmative action beneficiaries
in the awkward position of being admitted or hired for "the
particular ability to be a member of a minority group"'" as an
unstated but enforced part of their terms of admission or job
description.
Professor Malamud's focus on the white utility baseline
inherent in the diversity rationale, as well as Brown v. Board of
52 integrationist objective, strikes a chord with me
Education's
because it unmasks the privileging of white over minority
interests. However, the "diversity as white utility" critique fails
to appreciate either the coercive force of racial hierarchy that
requires the convergence of racial remedies with white interests,
or the diversity discourse's formative potential for creating
progressive, political communities.
Like critical legal studies' radical theoretical critique of civil
rights as legitimating existing power relations,53 Professor
Malamud's critique of the diversity rationale as legitimating
prioritization of white interests ignores how diversity has
provided conceptual and legal avenues for subordinated communities to gain moral and political capital and to ensure a measure
of relief from racial oppression. In order to fully appreciate the
role that diversity plays in the racial "war of position,"54 of which
the reasonable expectations of the framers of our antidiscrimination laws." Id. at
991. However, Malamud still concludes that "[a]ffirmative action is a poor substitute
[for effective antidiscrimination laws]," while acknowledging and offering no viable
alternative to ineffective antidiscrimination laws (but eliminating affirmative action
will not make the problem go away). Id.
50. See Malamud, supra note 1, at 958-64.
51. Id. at 964. Interestingly, for her sweeping statement that "[a]U things being
equal, members of minority groups would far prefer to be hired for their general
abilities, rather than for their particular ability to be a member of a minority group,"
she cites only to Stephen Carter's Reflections of an Affirmative Action Baby. Id. at
964 n.58.
52. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
53. See supra note 14.
54. See AN ANTONIO GRAMSci READER: SELECTED WRITINGS, 1916-1935, at
225-30 (David Forgacs ed., 1971) (characterizing war of maneuver as the "frontal
attack" and war of position as "siege warfare'). Omi and Winant describe the two
terms as follows:
'War of maneuver" describes a situation in which subordinate groups
seek to preserve and extend a definite territory, to ward off violent
assault, and to develop an internal society as an alternative to the
repressive social system they confront....
... .[W]ar of position can only be predicated on political struggle-on the
existence of diverse institutional and cultural terrains upon which
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the affirmative action question is a part, one must return to the
legal genesis of the diversity rationale and Justice Powell's 1978
Bakke opinion.55
At the time of the Bakke decision, affirmative action advocates had hoped that the courts would uphold the University of
California at Davis' affirmative action plan, which reserved
sixteen spots for students of color out of 100 first-year medical
school seats.5" But a divided Supreme Court struck down the
plan as an impermissible "quota'5 7 yet authorized the use of race
as a criterion in admissions to promote the legitimate state
interest of "diversity."5 8 Little did affirmative action advocates
know that what appeared to be a crushing defeat in 1978 would
become what Michael Olivas twenty years later referred to as the
"high point" of racial remedies.5 9
Affirmative action activists came to embrace the monopoly of
the diversity rationale as a pragmatic bargain-requiring
relinquishment of the compensatory rationale emphasizing
historical and contemporary racial discrimination in exchange for
the continued constitutional legitimacy of affirmative action now
permissible under the more palatable diversity rationale. °
Powell's opinion in Bakke, like Johnny Mercer's tongue-in-cheek

oppositional political projects can be mounted, an upon which the racial
state can be confronted.
OMI & WINANT, supra note 31, at 80.
55. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 320 (1978) (announcing
that a "properly devised admission program" may take race into account to ensure
the "diversity" of its student body); see also Foster, supra note 28, at 108 n.16 (noting
that Justice Powell first articulated and legitimated the forward-looking diversity
rationale in Bakke).
56. See JOEL DREYFUSS & CHARLES LAWRENCE, THE BAKKE CASE: THE POLITICS
OF INEQUALITY 19 (1979) (detailing the contours of the UC Davis affirmative action
plan).
57. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315-20.
58. Id. at 320.
59. See Michael A. Olivas, The Decisionis Flatly, Unequivocally Wrong, CHRON.
HIGHER EDUC., Mar. 29, 1996, at B3. In this editorial analyzing the recent decision
in Hopwood v. University of Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct.
2581 (1996), Professor Olivas comments on the irony posed by the increasingly
anti-affirmative action Supreme Court that renders affirmative action supporters
with nostalgic yearning for the "good old days" of Bakke. 'Who knew in 1978," Olivas
asks, "that we were at the high point of affirmative action, that its wave had crested,
that the Bakke decision is what we must fight to protect nearly twenty years later?'
Id.
60. Such a future-oriented rationale need not emphasize any institutional
wrongdoing in terms of de jure or de facto discrimination by institutions or employers
seeking to implement affirmative action.

19971

THE DIVERSITY DILEMMA

1051

World War II-era lyric, was an exhortation to "ac-cen-tuate the
positive"--diversity's benefits-and "e-lim-i-nate the negative"-talk of institutionalized and structural discrimination. 6'
Thus, the embrace of the diversity rationale has always had a
pragmatic side that unfortunately also helped make structural
subordination invisible.
To critique the current diversity regime for catering to
institutional utility is to adopt a temporally confined and
abstracted notion of racial politics. Professor Malamud's white
baseline critique of the diversity rationale, absent an understanding of the affirmative action wars of position fought over the past
twenty years, is flawed by presentism-it is a critique that erases
the historical contingency of a practice based on a logic that is
tested only by contemporary observations.6 2 Professor Malamud's
critique of diversity as serving white interests minimizes the
controlling context of racial ideology and racism that shaped the
adoption of diversity as a compromise rationale. She may
unadvisedly presume that it was (and is) possible, via proper
enlightenment-style argumentation, to convince courts of law and
public opinion that white-utility interests are not the proper
grounds for supporting necessary race-based remedies.
Further, Professor Malamud's critique of diversity seems to
underappreciate the concept's potential in organizing resistance
to racially repressive regimes. As an illustration of what I mean,
I shall relate my personal experience as a former student
organizer. I recall working with fellow law students to form an

61. JOHNNY MERCER & HAROLD ARLEN, Ac-cent-tchu.uate the Positive, on THE
CAPITOL RECORD SERIES (Capitol Records 1989). Richard Delgado observed how the
remedy of affirmative action similarly "eliminates the negative" historical
understanding of U.S. race relations:
Minorities are hired or promoted because we have been unfairly treated,
denied jobs, deprived of our lands, or beaten and brought here in chains.
Affirmative action neatly diverts our attention from all those disagreeable
details and calls for a fresh start. . . . At best, then, affirmative action
serves as a homeostatic device, assuring that only a small number of
women and people of color are hired or promoted. Not too many, for that
would be terrifying, nor too few, for that would be destabilizing.
Richard Delgado, Affirmative Action as a MajoritarianDevice: Or, Do You Really
Want to Be a Role Model?, 89 MICH. L. REv. 1222, 1223-24 (1991), reprinted in
CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTTING EDGE 355-56 (Richard Delgado ed., 1995).
62. See JUDITH BUTLER, BODIES THAT MATTER 223-28 (1993) (describing as
"presentist" the conceit of autonomy that one arrives in the world without history
and absent power relations, thereby enabling one to reclaim or resignify temporal
meanings by virtue of individual will or choice). I thank Robert Westley for bringing
Butler's definition to my attention.
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organization to promote affirmative action in faculty hiring at our
school, University of California at Berkeley's Boalt Hall. As one
of the first orders of business, we needed to agree on a name for
our organization. Eventually, we became known as the Boalt
Coalition for a Diversified Faculty ("CDIP'). However, I had
initially advocated what I felt was a more accurate name, the
Boalt Caucus for a Desegregated Faculty, since at the time, there
was only one tenured faculty member of color, and three white,
tenured women."3 Twenty years prior, there had been only one
tenured faculty member of color (and only one woman). 4 In the
end, I accepted "Diversified" over "Desegregated" because it
became clear that we would have more success attracting
members and achieving our goals with the more palatable
moniker.
This was true because of the powerful effects of "interest
convergence." 5 We had to phrase our civil rights agenda in terms
of white majority interests. 6 Diversity would benefit everyone,
majority and minority faculty and students alike. It would put a
happy face on racial oppression and would not require anyone to
stipulate to white, heterosexual, or male privilege, thereby
increasing chances for reaching the broadest possible membership
base. 7 In another sense, it would permit anyone, whatever their
63. See Flyer Announcing One of the First Meetings for the Caucus for a
Desegregated Faculty on Oct. 1, 1986 (on file with University of Colorado Law
Review). These statistics were supplied to our organization by the Boalt
administration for 1986-87. For confirmation, see Memorandum from Nola Yee,
Coordinator, Publications and Communications, Boalt Hall School of Law, University
of California at Berkeley, to Melanie Lewis, Editor-in-Chief, University of Colorado
Law Review (June 16, 1997) (on file with University of Colorado Law Review). In
actuality, the statistic of three tenured women at Boalt for 1986-87 overstated the
case, as one of the three professors was jointly appointed in law and sociology. Thus,
the more accurate number of tenured women faculty at Boalt was 2%.
64. Boalt faculty personnel records for 1967 reflect these numbers. See id.
65. See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the InterestConvergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 523 (1980) (arguing that racial
remedies are extended to redress injuries suffered by Blacks only when, if granted,
such remedies "will secure, advance, or at least not harm societal interests deemed
important by middle and upper class whites').
66. See id. Bell's interest-convergence analysis provides the foundation for
Professor Malamud's "white utility" criticisms of diversity. See also Richard Delgado,
The Imperial Scholar: Reflections on a Review of Civil Rights Literature,132 U. PA.
L. REV. 561 (1984) (criticizing the white utility-based justifications of affirmative
action as demeaning to minority admittees who are treated as ornaments who exist
to pique the curiosity of white professors and students).
67. This multiple-consciousness understanding of liberal terminology is
characterized by Kimberl6 Crenshaw as "self-conscious ideological struggle," engaged
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level of political engagement, to join the movement for racial
justice, and thus continue the dialogical process of developing a
critical understanding of racial power relations. Finally, "Diversified" projected the image (corresponding to a stated commitment)
of a broader coalitional membership.6 8 Desegregation, of course,
implies a historical practice of racial separation and exclusion.6 9
Such a word in our organizational name would have conveyed the
primacy of racial oppression over other forms of oppression. I
believe we were ultimately more successful as a movement than
any of us thought possible when we started the organization
because of our ability to achieve coalitional appeal. "Diversity" in
our name did not diminish the multiple consciousness that led us
to choose that word, and it announced a coalitional stance in the
struggle for a more inclusive faculty and law school atmosphere.
Our movement was not an isolated one in the late eighties to
early nineties. ° Across the country, a variety of multicultural,
diversity movements sprang up at college campuses demanding
ethnic studies graduation requirements, student and faculty
affirmative action, gay and lesbian studies, and multicultural
centers.7 ' These "diversity movements" largely addressed the

to "minimize the costs of liberal reform while maximizing its utility." Crenshaw,
supra note 8, at 1385.
68. Our objective was to increase racial, gender, sexual orientation, and
intellectual diversity on the Boalt Hall faculty. Our constituencies and position
statements reflected these imperatives. See, e.g., Coalition for a Diversified Faculty
Statement of Position (May 3, 1989) (proclaiming that diversity of perspectives at
Boalt Hall "can only be attained if the faculty's composition with regard to race,
gender, sex, sexuality, and ideology are broadened") (on file with University of
ColoradoLaw Review); Open Letter to Boalt Students Re: Nationwide Law Student
Strike (Apr. 5, 1990) (announcing purpose of the strike as protesting "Unequal
Treatment Under the Law: Racism, Sexism, Classism, and Heterosexism in
America's Law Schools") (on file with University of ColoradoLaw Review).
69. Bell refers to the NAACP's concerted legal desegregation strategy as
intended "to eliminate racial segregation, not merely in the public schools but
throughout society." Derrick Bell, Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and
Client Interests in School DesegregationLitigation, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE
KEY WR]TINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT 6 (Kimberl6 Crenshaw et al. eds.,
1995).
70. See Foster, supra note 28, at 108-09 (noting that diversity movements on
campuses nationwide urge faculties to "diversify"); JoY JAMES, TRANSCENDING THE
TALENTED TENTH: BLACK LEADERS AND AMERICAN INTELLECTUALS 172-73 (1997)
(describing a 1992 student movement at University of Massachusetts-Amherst
demanding affirmative action faculty hiring).
71. See Foster, supra note 28, at 108 (observing that "diversity has been
invoked more generally in this society as a justification for hiring more minorities
and women on university faculties, for increasing university multicultural and ethnic
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cultural injustice of exclusion from academia, and may in the long
run even have served the interests of institutions that initially
opposed diversification. But whether diversity can be co-opted to
serve hegemonic interests is a question that should be answered
in the broader context of its potential as a coalitional organizing
concept.72 Likewise, we should assess seriously the accomplishments of the diversity rationale in underwriting claims to access
for communities of color to higher education and employment
before too hastily dispensing with such an effective discursive
formation.73

studies requirements, for including more minorities and women in the workforce,
and for awarding scholarships on the basis of race").
Most recently, in the wake of California's Proposition 209's resegregation of
higher education, a new student organization at Boalt Hall calling itself "New
Directions in Diversity" formed and released a more than 100-page report on
diversity in law school admissions. See Cecilia V. Estolano et al., New Directions in
Diversity: Charting Law School Admissions Policy in a Post-Affirmative Action Era
(May 9, 1997) (on file with University of Colorado Law Review). The concept of
diversity as a tool of resistance and coalition in a political environment hostile to
affirmative action is even more important today at Boalt than when CDF was active
in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
72. In my own work, I have been troubled by the way in which successfully
advocated, multicultural requirements and affirmative action hiring have been used
by universities, schools, and departments to portray themselves as self-correcting
institutions of enlightened fairness. This portrayal tends to inhibit the future ability
of students to organize "counter-hegemonically" in light of the alleged institutional
progress on racial remediation.
Nevertheless, a New Left critique might only dismiss the end product of
absorption of a racial challenge as the bottom-line measurement of "radicality,"
which I believe misses the important community formation insight. A better
measurement of transformative politics would evaluate the progress (or regress) not
only in terms of the ultimate substantive/programmatic changes implemented, but
the process by which those changes occurred. The bottom-line assessment of
radicality must weigh the extent to which the process of change mobilizes, vocalizes,
and energizes subjected communities of color.
73. Here, I agree with Crenshaw when she states that such [self-conscious,
ideological] struggle is necessary because:
Black people can afford neither to resign themselves to, nor attack
frontally, the legitimacy and incoherence of the dominant ideology. The
subordinate position of Blacks in this society makes it unlikely that
African-Americans will realize gains through the kind of direct challenge
to the legitimacy of American liberal ideology that is now being waged by
Critical scholars.
Crenshaw, supra note 8, at 1385.
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PROFESSOR MALAMUD'S PROPOSALS FOR REFORM

Throughout her article, Professor Malamud suggests that her
proposals involve bold social and political risk-taking.74 As a

74. See, e.g., Malamud, supra note 1, at 951, 955, 998. For example, her
subtitles, "Avoiding Hard Questions About Black Middle-Class Performance,"
"Ignoring the Problem of Black Middle-Class Performance Does Not Make It Go
Away," and "Saying Words That Hurt," evince a bold posture and general
chastisement of those not engaging in such risk-taking. Id. In fact, at one point,
Professor Malamud asserts that "[s]ilence in the face of [white-Black standardized
test] differences is irresponsible, especially in light of the legal, moral, and political
problems the differences present." Id. at 955. But there is another reading of this
silence. Certain settled debates do not warrant ongoing discussion on the basis that
discussion dignifies, and is therefore complicit in returning society to retrograde
debates. Many scholars and politicians refuse to debate or engage seriously
Holocaust deniers for this very reason. Similarly, many race critical scholars wish
not to revisit and normalize the "Bell Curve" debate that returns U.S. race discourse
to the eugenical period of biological determinism. For this discourse, see generally
CHARLES DAVENPORT, HEREDITY INRELATION TO EUGENICS (1911); HENRY HERBERT
GODDARD, FEEBLEMINDEDNESS: ITS CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES (1914); E.S. GOSNEY
& PAUL POPENOE, STERILIZATION FOR HUMAN BETTERMENT (1930); MADISON GRANT,
THE PASSING OF THE GREAT RACE (1919); HARRY HAMILTON LAUGHLIN, EUGENICAL
STERILIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES (1922); PAUL POPENOE & ROSWELL H. JOHNSON,

APPLIED EUGENICS (1918); PsychologicalExamining in the United States Army, in
15 MEMOIRS OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES (Robert M. Yerkes ed., 1921);
LOTHROP STODDARD, THE REVOLT AGAINST CIVILIZATION: THE MENACE OF THE
UNDERMAN (1922).

By no means is eugenical scholarship and ideology limited to the pre-World War
II era. The Bell Curve by Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray was a national
bestseller in 1994. RICHARD HERRNSTEIN & CHARLES MURRAY, THE BELL CURVE:
INTELLIGENCE AND CLASS STRUCTURE IN AMERICAN LIFE (1994). For a thorough
tracing of postwar neo-eugenical scholarship, see WILLIAM TUCKER, THE SCIENCE AND
POLITICS OF RACIAL RESEARCH 138-295 (1994). Some of the works cited by Tucker in
this tradition include: HANS J. EYSENCK, THE INEQUALITY OF MAN (1973) (warning

that political attempts to disregard nature's laws of genetically determined
inequality are "doomed to failure'); Linda S. Gottfredson, Societal Consequences of
the g Factor in Employment, 29 J. OF VOCATIONAL BEHAV. 379, 398-406 (1986)

(arguing that lower Black intelligence produces the expected outcome of
socioeconomic inequality); Dwight J. Ingle, Racial Differences and the Future,146
SCIENCE 375, 376-378 (1964) (arguing that the high fertility rate of "indolent
incompetent Negroes is a threat to the future success of this race'); Arthur R.
Jensen, How Much Can We Boost IQ and Scholastic Achievement?, 39 HARV. EDUC.
REV. 1, 82 (1969) (concluding that "various lines of evidence ...
viewed all together,
make it a not unreasonable hypothesis that genetic factors are strongly implicated
in the average Negro-white intelligence difference'); J. Philippe Rushton, Race
Differences in Behaviour: A Review and EvolutionaryAnalysis, 9 PERSONALITY &
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 1009 (1988) (finding that Blacks systematically rank lower

than whites on traits such as intelligence, brain size, sexual restraint, etc., that
separate humans from lower primates).
Professor Malamud may be correct that the contemporary resurgence of
pseudo-scientific racism and biological determinism requires a breaking of silence
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risk-taker, I welcomed the prospect of a bumpy ride. But to my
disappointment, I felt that Professor Malamud's proposal to
replace the diversity rationale with the compensatory rationale
lacked transformative vision and reflected a more general failure
of the liberal imagination as it confronts issues of social justice in
the post-Reagan era.7" In essence, Professor Malamud adopts a
neo-Myrdalian model of "societal discrimination as prejudice.""
Like Myrdal, Professor Malamud rejects biological determinism
as an explanation for Black underperformance and inequality,
and expands Myrdal's prejudice thesis by identifying societal
discrimination, not merely individual prejudices, as a key
determining factor. And like Myrdal, she leaves uninterrogated
existing systems of meritocracy and reinforces an essentialized
understanding of white over Black race relations.
A.

ProfessorMalamud's Non-Critique of Meritocracy

Prejudice models of racial inequality, defined largely by
Gunnar Myrdal, view racial discrimination as an irrational byproduct of leftover prejudices from the days of slavery." The
solution for such prejudice is to educate individuals beyond the

on such debates. However, if such a debate is to occur, I would hope that its starting
point is not centered on rebuttal of asserted intellectual, biological, cultural, or moral
deficiencies of people of color-especially African Americans-but on the social
meaning and irony of the resurgence of such theories in a post-civil rights,
purportedly "color-blind" America.
75. In her four-celled matrix, Fraser identifies affirmative versus
transformational types of remedies that address redistributive and recognitional
injustice. See Fraser, supra note 34, at 87. Fraser identifies transformational
remedies as those offering a deep restructuring of relations of production and
recognition, while affirmative remedies merely conduct surface reallocations of
existing goods and identities. See id.
76. This paradigm, while a forward advance from the eugenical belief in the
inherent inferiority of people of color, nevertheless adopted a strategy of assimilation
for African Americans and endorsed the existing structures of the U.S. political
economy. See MYRDAL, supra note 15, at 906 (arguing for educational priorities that
"make the Negro child adaptable to and movable in the American culture at large');
see also OMI & WINANT, supra note 31, at 17. Professor Malamud's analysis is
"neo"-Myrdalian in that she is not advocating for assimilation per se, but she, like
Myrdal, fails to critique the existing political-economic structure.
77. See generally MYRDAL, supra note 15, Part II, Chapters 4-6 (tracing how
whites need to rationalize the practice of slavery with their belief in the "American
Creed'). See also DAVID SOUTHERN, GUNNAR MYRDAL AND BLACK-WHITE RELATIONS:
THE USE AND ABUSE OF AN AMERICAN DILEMMA 1944-1969, at 61 (1987) (noting how
the slavery rationale 'led [whites] to develop elaborate, if transparently expedient,
theories of black inferiority).
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irrationality of their racist beliefs. However, Myrdal's prejudice
model does not ground a systematic critique of societal structures
or power relations, 7s and Professor Malamud does not steer such
a collision course.
Professor Malamud makes clear that she favors affirmative
action as a tool of reformation, not transformation.7 9 In fact, she
opposes the diversity rationale precisely because it is "dangerous
if no effort is made to account for why the black middle class
cannot compete on traditional merit criteria,"" thereby inviting
society to duck from the question of why the "thumb on the
scale"'" for Black hiring and admissions "needs to be so heavy." 2
Professor Malamud's liberal conclusion that socioeconomic
inequalities, as opposed to biological or cultural deficiencies, are
at the root of the results of Black test-takers does not question the
ability or the accuracy of standardized tests to measure merit, nor
the extent to which the meritocracy can be expected to flex with
any changes
that might tend to favor currently "underachieving"
3
8

groups.

It is not disparate test scores per se that reveal the
insidiousness of meritocracy as much as that regime's functional-

78. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
79. Professor Malamud's arguments and framing of issues belie a firm belief in
the system of meritocracy in place at institutions of higher education, and therefore
represent the advocacy of Fraser's category of "affirmative" racial remedies, which
require ongoing surface reallocations to subordinate groups because no deep
restructuring project is undertaken. For Professor Malamud's merit-friendly framing
of the issues, see supra note 74. Other statements evince a firm and uncritical
acceptance of the ideology and practice of contemporary meritocracy. See infra notes
80-83 and accompanying text.
80. Malamud, supra note 1, at 955.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Cf. Sturm & Guinier, supra note 18, at 968 (referring to the widespread
belief in the functionality of standardized tests as a "testocracy" that masquerades
as "meritocracy," and finding that "[s]tandardized tests are neither fair, functional,
nor predictive'). See generally Leslie G. Espinoza, The LSAT Narrativesand Bias,
1 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 121 (1993) (examining racially biased narratives in LSAT
questions); Olivas, supra note 18; Michael Selmi, Testing for Equality: Merit,
Efficiency, and the Affirmative Action Debate, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1251 (1995)
(contending that employment tests are typically weak predictors of future
productivity and that individual test scores do not accurately measure a person's
true abilities); Linda F. Wightman, The Threat to Diversity in Legal Education: An
Empirical Analysis of the Consequences of Abandoning Race as a Factor in Law.
School Admission Decisions, 72 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 34 (1997) (concluding that
overreliance upon LSAT scores in law school admissions decisions results in a loss
of validity and a systematic and predictable discriminatory selection process).
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ity within the "iron cage" 4 of white supremacy. To leave our
analysis subject to the general premises of meritocracy will
ensure the persistence of superficial redistributions at the
margins of the social economy as the sole corrective. Of course,
the so-called "radical critique of merit," which refuses to afford
merit the sanctified status of a mathematical certainty, would
find Professor Malamud's implicit defense of merit as reproductive of the historical and ongoing racial economy, certainly not
transformative of it. 5 Fraser sees the end result of affirmative
(as opposed to transformative) remedies as marking "the most
disadvantaged class as inherently deficient and insatiable, as
always needing more and more. In time, such a class can even
come to appear privileged, the recipient of special treatment and
undeserved largesse. ''s
Fraser's warning reflects a concern that deeper structures of
domination may actually be strengthened when reforms are
undertaken in ways that leave unchallenged the operational logic
of subordinational systems. Race-critical approaches 7 would
encompass both a critique of the socioeconomic determinants of
particular outcomes of merit assessment, as offered by Professor
Malamud, and the more thorough-going radical critique that
makes visible the differentational logic of racial supremacy which
historically, institutionally, and ideologically grounds meritocracy. From this perspective it is crucial to interrogate the utopia

84. RONALD TAKAKI, IRON CAGEs: RACE AND CULTURE IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY
AMERICA (1979).

85. For one "radical critique of merit," see Sturm & Guinier, supra note 18, at
996 (arguing that "the existing meritocracy excludes people based on their race,
gender, and class status" and simultaneously "includes people who are wealthy,
male, and white," . . . thereby granting "further advantages to the already
advantaged" and "creat[ing] barriers for those who are not").
86. Fraser, supra note 34, at 85.
87. By race-critical approaches, I include critical race praxis, see Yamamoto,
supra note 20, and multiple consciousness, see Mari J. Matsuda, When the First
Quail Calls: Multiple Consciousnessas JurisprudentialMethod, 11 WOMEN'S RTs. L.
REP. 7, 9 (1989); Matsuda, supra note 13. Indeed, legal progressives within the
Society of American Law Teachers (a liberal-progressive membership organization
of legal academics) and critical race theory (institutionalized through an annual
summer workshop) are articulating searching critiques of diversity as an inadequate
rationale with which to ground comprehensive racial remediation programs. See 9th
Annual Critical Race Theory Workshop Program (1997) (reflecting a plenary session
entitled, "Rethinking Racial Remedies: Beyond Meritocratic Diversity") (on file with
author).
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of equal opportunity standardized test-taking as a sufficient
vision of a racially just future.
B.

The CompensatoryRationale and the Essentialized
Black-White Understandingof Race Relations

Gunnar Myrdars race relations project focused on historical
and contemporary experiences between African Americans and
whites.8 8 By privileging the experience of slavery as primary,
Myrdal distinguishes African American experiences from those of
other racial group experiences.8 9
This racialized form of
"exceptionalism" provides the basis for placing limitations on
racial remedies. 90

88. Myrdal's study commissioned by the Carnegie Corporation was devised at
the outset as an in-depth study of African Americans. See SOUTHERN, supra note 77,
at 1.

89. Myrdal concluded that the problems of Blacks departed significantly from
those of other racial minority groups:
It was true that other groups such as the Chinese and Japanese suffered
because of their race. But the black minority constituted the largest
group regarded as unassimilable by the white majority. And because
blacks were the only Americans who had been enslaved and subjected to
a rigid caste system, black-white relations, Myrdal maintained, could not
be approached as a typical minority problem.
Id. at 59.
90. For a racialized example of exceptionalism, see SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET,
AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM (1996).

The situation of African Americans has been qualitatively different from
that of any other racial or ethnic minority in the United States. African
Americans did not come willingly to this country seeking reprieve from
poverty or discrimination; they were, rather, forced into the status of an
underclass facing racism from the start .... They are thus the great

exception to the American Creed, to American ideological exceptionalism.
Id. at 113. See also, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 527 (Scalia,
J., concurring) ("It is plainly true that in our society blacks have suffered

discrimination immeasurably greater than any directed at other racial groups."
Angela Harris is currently theorizing the phenomenon of"Black exceptionalism,"
a work-in-progress that she presented at the LatCritlI conference in San Antonio,
Texas, on May 3, 1997. See Leslie Espinoza & Angela P. Harris, Embracing the Tar
Baby: LatCrit Theory and the Sticky Mess of 'Race," 10 LA RAZA L.J. (forthcoming
Nov. 1997). While I find the forms of racialized exceptionalism mentioned above and
by Malamud to be problematic and anti-coalitional, I heed the caution issued by John
Calmore, who observes that certain appeals to transcend the bipolar conception of
race may lead to an "ahistorical decontextualization" of racial oppression and an
diminishment of the "recognized need to redress the perpetuation of [an oppressive]
history that particularly plagues African Americans." John Calmore, Exploring
Michael Omi's "Messy"Real World of Race: An Essay for "NakedPeople Longing to
Swim Free," 15 LAW & INEQ. J. 25, 61-62 (1997).

1060

UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68

Professor Malamud's acceptance of the white over Black
framework is particularly ironic since she is ostensibly restoring
a race analysis to class-based paradigms of affirmative action. 91
Her objective is contradicted by the undermining of a unified
concept of race. 92 Race cannot be unified through the concept of
white supremacy because Professor Malamud rejects the
operation of white supremacy in structuring social relations of
people of color broadly,9" and generally defends the legitimacy of
meritocracy. 94 Race analysis applies primarily, and perhaps
exclusively, to African Americans. As Professor Malamud
divulges, "Some of the patterns I have pointed to in the disadvantaging of the black middle class either do not exist or exist to a far
lesser extent for other minority groups. Can coalitions among
peoples of color-and between peoples of color and womensurvive the particularizing of the extent of their socioeconomic
disadvantage?" 95 This passage reveals that, whereas she had
seen the Black middle class as racialized, she assumes the
predominantly class-determined nature of other groups of color,
and further assumes that political identity formation for these
groups hinges upon class instead of race, as if race for these
groups does not have its own set of formative imperatives.
In fact, she consistently places Asian Pacific Americans
(APAs) closer to whites along the white-Black dyad, so that APA
political interests are pitted against those of African Americans.
When she criticizes the diversity rationale because of its impact
on "overachieving minorities," she refers to APAs, along with
Jews, as "classic American 'model minorities."' 96 While she has
91. Professor Malamud ingeniously intervenes in the class-based affirmative
action policy debate by arguing that racial differences and biases inhere in the
definition and experience among classes--here, the middle class. See Malamud,
supranote 1, at 988 (contending that "the evidence supports the claim that the black
middle class is economically disadvantaged in comparison with the white middle
class for reasons centrally related to its race").
92. See id. at 999-1000.
93. See id. Professor Malamud forwards her own racialized version of the
"exceptionalist" argument-that is, African Americans are uniquely discriminated
against on the basis of race, which reserves affirmative action as a middle-class
remedy for Blacks only. See id.
94. See supra notes 79-83 and accompanying text.
95. Malamud, supra note 1, at 999.
96. Id. at 965 ("Another problem with a pure diversity rationale is its political
unpalatability to groups that ought to be part of the civil rights coalition, but that are
currently 'overrepresented' in choice positions. I think here of classic American
'model minorities': Jews and, more recently, Asian Americans."). Her use of quotes
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a good point about how the diversity rationale can serve to
discriminate more harshly against APAs than whites in what
Jerry Kang refers to as "negative action, 97 she makes this point
by reinscribing problematic stereotypes of APAs as a uniformly
successful, exemplary minority who do not face racial discrimination and who are locked in a zero-sum relationship with African
Americans.
The dominant white over Black framing of liberal racial
remedies locks such reforms into a narrow range of experimentation because of a failure of imagination. Because merit embraces
a white baseline of performance, and societal discrimination
embraces a Black baseline of experience, those caught in between
the white-Black polarity have difficulty living up to either white
defined norms of achievement, or Black defined norms of discrimination. A feedback problem arises: if white liberals influenced by
the white over Black dichotomy define the measurement of racial
discrimination so that only African Americans qualify as victims
of societal discrimination, then only African American problems
of discrimination are studied and funded, so that the findings of
African American discrimination become legitimate and verify the
existing measurement of racial discrimination, and so on.
An alternative racial formation analysis would conceptually
link the experiences of various groups of color through the
critique of white supremacy.9" The challenge for critical race
theory is to analyze how consistent and divergent the injuries and
contestations of white supremacy are among groups of color.9 9

around model minority are not suspect quotes since the rest of her text supports the
construction of APAs as a model minority. Therefore, her use of quotes is meant to
signify that the term model minority is someone else's.
97. Jerry Kang, Negative Action Against Asian Pacific Americans: The Internal
Instability of Dworkin's Defense of Affirmative Action, 31 HARV. C. R.-C.L. L. REV. 1
(1996) (arguing that Dworkin's defense of affirmative action based on "diversity"
arguments may lead to favoring whites over APAs where APAs are represented in
university admissions or employment sectors above their national population of three
percent).
98. For an excellent example of such an alternative formulation, see TOMAS
ALMAGUER, RACIAL FAULT LINES: THE HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF WHITE SUPREMACY IN

CALIFORNIA 210 (1994) (comparing the Nineteenth Century experiences of Native
Americans, Chicana/os, and Asian Americans in California as united by the
"enactment of group interests, to retain privileged access to social rewards for
European Americans").
99. See Yamamoto, supra note 20, at 892 (prioritizing the critical race project
of "differentiation"--that is, to explore how "varying historical experiences and
current socio-economic conditions create different racial images, status and power
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CONCLUSION

Professor Malamud's defense of affirmative action makes
pivotal the legitimation of affirmative action for the Black middle
class under a compensatory rationale of socioeconomic discrimination. But her well-intended defense of racial remedies may serve
another unintended purpose. In order to reclaim the compensatory rationale, Malamud finds it necessary to discount the
diversity rationale. Diversity, it seems, is far too dangerous and
permissive a defense. Read with this emphasis, Malamud's
subtextual objective is to develop limiting principles with which
the Pandora's box of affirmative action as an untamed, morally
compromised racial remedy may be properly contained and
therefore sustained.
Perhaps my disagreement with Professor Malamud can be
traced back to an interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment
that diverges from those au courant. The Supreme Court fears,
and thinks that the Fourteenth Amendment protects against, an
impermissible "racial spoils system"'' 0 that would unjustly enrich
a group absent a finding of discrimination.' I do not share this
general view of the Fourteenth Amendment. Instead I believe it
represents a kind of "survival
covenant" that this nation entered
10 2
into after the Civil War.

Slavery and other forms of racial oppression and supremacy
isomorphically or homologously related to slavery were the
occasion of the covenant.'
For our nation to survive it had to

among racial groups'); see also Calmore, supra note 90, at 72 (acknowledging how
"[r]acism in America mutates and impacts people of color in similar and different
ways").
100. See supra note 12.
101. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 495-96, 506 (1989)
(calling into question the remedial motivation of the majority-Black Richmond city
council's affirmative action plan: 'The gross overinclusiveness of Richmond's racial
preference strongly impugns the city's claim of remedial motivation").
102. See Meister, supra note 19, at 123 (describing the survival covenant as an
alternative understanding of the U.S. Constitution "based originally on the need to
recover from the horrors of slavery and the Civil War and to protect the living
victim-survivors, as we shall call them-from a repetition of past patterns of
abuse"). As a "national survival story," Meister argues that the Fourteenth
Amendment must be understood so that "each new repetition of a pattern or .practice
of racism is a new violation of rights. When such a new violation can be shown, the
presumption that it revives old traumas can justify the imposition of drastic
remedies." Id. at 169.
103. I add to Meister's single example of slavery to ground the survival
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solemnly declare its permanent repudiation of the "original sin"
of slavery and white supremacy, and all subsequent related forms
This is the unstated predicate of the Fourof racial injury.'
teenth Amendment. I maintain that the Fourteenth Amendment
has no meaning at all outside this covenant. The Amendment
that would protect endangered whites from an impermissible
spoils system involves a different covenant whose time has, by a
far sight, not yet arrived. 105
Professor Malamud's rejection of the diversity rationale, and
perhaps her understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment, reflect
a liberal concern that "pandemonium is liable to walk upon the
scene,"' 6 if we do not ground affirmative action in the compensatory rationale and the white over Black binarism that would
provide tolerable limiting principles. From my perspective, this
preoccupation prevents the liberal imagination from truly
"latching on to the affirmative"-action, that is-and leaves it
messing with old "Mr. In-Between."l °7

covenant; genocide and enslavement of indigenous peoples, conquest of the southwest
territories resulting in Mexican/American land dispossession, and colonial labor
policies and immigration exclusion directed toward Asian immigrants, are some
examples of other forms of racial oppression. While his survival covenant theory is
grounded historically in the African American experience and could be used to
support "Black exceptionalism," see supra note 90, his interpretation that the
covenant prevents "each new pattern or practice of racism" as possibly reviving the
racial trauma of slavery is broad enough to mount a unified race critique of white
supremacy. See Meister, supra note 19, at 169.
104. See Meister, supra note 19, at 123, 169.
105. For example, although white men make up 48% of the college educated
workforce, they hold more than 90% of the top jobs in news media, 90% of officer
positions and 88% of the directorships in U.S. corporations, 85% of tenured college
professorships, and 80% of management level jobs in advertising, marketing, and
public relations. See Affirmative Action Still Needed to Keep the Workplace Fair,
MINORITY MARKETS ALERT, Dec. 1, 1995. The weekly median white male earnings
for 1992 was 33% higher than that of any other U.S. group. See GLASS CEILING
COMM'N, GOOD FOR BUSINESS: MAKING FULL USE OF THE NATION'S HUMAN CAPITAL,
THE ENVIRONMENTAL SCAM (Mar. 1995).
106. MERCER & ARLEN, supra note 61.
107. Id.
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